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The aim of this paper is two-fold. The first is to put forth a method for analyzing how populism 
functions as a discursive practice. I seek to formulate an understanding of populism that 
highlights the phenomenon’s three essential discursive features. I refer to these features as “the 
people”, “the elite”, and “the crisis”. The second aim of this paper is to expand on the contingent 
and socially constructed nature of “crisis”. I intend to show how populism is inextricably linked 
to the construction of “crisis” and how populists use crisis narratives to justify their 
undemocratic tactics and consolidations of power.  
  
 Writing this paper in 2020, it is rather uncontentious to argue that we are living in the 
midst of a populist wave. The election of Donald Trump in 2016, the culmination of Brexit, and 
the increasing popularity of right-wing populism in Europe are all signs of populism’s growing 
presence in the world today. Consequently, since 2016, “populism”  has become a mainstream 
term, emerging in popular discourses and media outlets across the world and being applied to a 
wide array of political actors and movements. Despite becoming widely used, mainstream 
understandings of populism do not reflect the conceptual nuances of the term. Often, the term is 
used to categorize unusual or unfamiliar political phenomena that appear extremist. In these 
instances, populism is typically conflated with what are in fact nationalist, nativist, or far-right 
stances, none of which are essential or unique to populism. Mainstream depictions of populism, 
particularly on the left, are based on normative assessments, with the term often being used 
pejoratively to label some sort of political movement or political leader as a threat to the existing 
democratic order. 
Negative portrayals of populism may not be totally unfounded - there are perhaps reasons 
to be wary of populism’s growing appeal - but they reduce populism’s significance and conceal 
the fact that it is one of the most salient political movement in the world today. In some sense, 
populism can be compared to previous sociopolitical movements like the civil rights movement, 
the women’s suffrage movement, or the gay right’s movement. As with these sociopolitical 
movements, populism as a discourse seeks to mobilize a mass of people to challenge a particular 
status quo. Specifically, populism’s challenge is aimed at existing democratic power structures, 
which populists claim are manipulated by corrupt, self-serving political elites who intentionally 
marginalize the voice of the people. In some sense then, populism can be thought of as a radical 
democratic discourse that attempts to give a voice to the voiceless.  
Though populism has existed for more than 100 years, it bobs up in unusual places and in 
unexpected times, raising the logical question: why are we seeing populism now? History tells us 
that the emergence of sociopolitical movements and counter discourses is almost always 
unexpected. There were for example, long periods in history where it was seen as logical for 
women to be forbidden from voting, or for gay people to be prohibited from marrying. Such 
dominant narratives therefore went unchallenged for a very long time. There is then something 
peculiar about the ways in which social movements emerge and the timing of their coalescence. 
It is very important that we try to understand why and how sociopolitical movements materialize 
and how they become successful when they have previously been unsuccessful.  
This is a question with which post-structuralist political theorists are particularly 
concerned. To post-structuralists, social change is never deterministic. The rise and success of 
social movements is not inevitable, rather, their success lies in individual actors’ ability to create 
discourses that compel large numbers of people to mobilize and join a movement. In order to 
mount a credible challenge against a dominant discourse, a new discourse must be constructed in 
such a way that it appeals to the masses and unites a plurality of people under a single umbrella. 
This is the only way that counter discourses can seek to replace dominant ones. Two post-
structural scholars have been particularly influential in this area of study: Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe. In their book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe argue that 
narratives seeking to affect social change can only be effective when they incorporate three 
essential mechanisms of discourse. First, the discourse must present society in an antagonistic 
way, meaning it divides society into two antagonistic groups: the oppressed and the oppressor. 
Second, this antagonism must highlight a clear power inequality between the oppressed and the 
oppressor and signal the moral unjustness of this inequality. Third, the discourse must present 
this power struggle as part of a larger, longer-lasting struggle. Laclau and Mouffe argue that 
these three discursive mechanisms are present in all successful sociopolitical movements, and 
therefore, no movement can be successful without them (Laclau and Mouffe 1990). 
Populism has without a doubt been successful. Populist parties have appeared in 
democracies across the world, mobilizing millions of supporters, and in some countries, where 
populists have been elected to the highest offices of power, they have carried out - or are 
currently carrying out - radical institutional changes in the name of the people. Laclau, Mouffe, 
and other post-structuralists would argue that populism’s success is a result of populist figures’ 
ability to construct compelling narratives that convince people to join their movement against an 
oppressive democratic establishment. By this logic, the populist narrative has been successful 
because it has employed the basic discursive mechanisms that Laclau and Mouffe outline in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. If we are to understand populism and understand how it has 
become a successful counter discourse, it is essential that we understand how it functions at a 
discursive level and what its central discursive features are. This is the central aim of this paper. 
More than fifty years ago, two academics studying populism wrote , “There can, at 
present, be no doubt about the importance of populism. But no one is clear just what it is...It bobs 
up everywhere but in many and cuontradictory shapes. Does it have any underlying unity, or 
does one name cover a multitude of unconnected tendencies? (Ionescu and Gellner 1970). As 
this quote serves to illustrate, the concept of populism has frustrated and eluded political 
scientists for decades. Bobbing” up everywhere, in a variety of historical and political contexts, 
there is a certain “impalpability” and “awkward conceptual slipperiness” (Taggart, 2000) to the 
phenomenon. Though today, more than fifty years ago, there is some growing consensus among 
academics about what populism is, the concept remains hotly contested and debated.  
 In my efforts to uncover populism’s central discursive features, I turn to the rich 
academic literature on the subject in order to conduct a sort of critical literature review. This is 
the task to which the first section of this paper is dedicated. I will discuss some of the most 
relevant literature on populism in order to highlight both the vast differences in how populism 
had been conceptualized but also, and more importantly, the commonalities that appear across 
the literature. In my opinion, academics stand on far more common ground than perhaps they 
realize, with many scholars agreeing on populism’s central features but still finding ways to 
debate one another. Therefore, those features that appear most often across the literature should 
be synthesized into one concise definition.  
As I see it, populist narratives are founded on three central discursive features, which 
satisfy the essential discursive criteria spelled out by Laclau and Mouffe. The features are: (1) an 
appeal to ‘the people’, (2) an attack against “the elite”, (3) and the construction of a “crisis. 
Together, these discursive features create an antagonistic frontier between ‘the people’ 
(oppressed) and ‘the elite’ (oppressor) and then link this antagonism to a larger systemic struggle 
through the construction of ‘the crisis’. The literature review section will conclude with an 
analysis of each of these features, demonstrating why they have such wide-reaching appeal, how 
they justify the radical change that populist’s call for, and how they position the populist as the 
leader of this movement. Understanding what these discursive features are will enable future 
researchers to identify populism as it emerges. Researchers can do so by looking to the 
discourses and language of political actors. Understanding how these discursive features function 
will provide a better understanding of why populism is successful and under what conditions it 
emerges.  
What separates populist movements from other sociopolitical movements is that they are 
led by a single individual, an individual who is vying for political power and seeking to change 
the political status quo. Anytime that a political figure seeks to make substantial changes to 
political institutions it is important to interrogate how these changes will benefit the people, but 
also how these changes may be in the interests of the individual. For this reason, it is important 
to approach an analysis of populism with some cynicism, for it is not unreasonable to consider 
that populists may be acting in their own self-interest, rather than in the interests of the collective 
they claim to represent. It is in the second section of this paper that I apply a more cynical 
analysis of populism, it’s leaders, and the discourses they construct. My approach will 
incorporate elements of constructivism and post-structuralism, for both schools of thought are 
uniquely concerned with the socially contingent nature of political discourses and the power 
relations between political actors and citizens.  
One of post-structuralism’s central tenets is that our sense of reality - what is “objective” 
- is contingent upon the dominant socially constructed narratives that we subscribe to. For a post-
structuralist, meaning is never fixed, all phenomena and all events that occur can sustain 
multiple, contradictory interpretations simultaneously. Crudely speaking, everything is 
subjective. But post-structuralists are not relativists for they recognize that at any given time 
there are dominant cultural and political narratives to which massive numbers of people 
subscribe. These then become the point of study. It is the dominant narratives that shape our 
understandings of what is good, what is bad, what is truth, and what is real, therefore it becomes 
vital to investigate the conditions under which dominant narratives take hold. Post-structuralists 
are then also interested in looking at how counter-narratives and counter-discourses (like 
populism) gain support and launch a credible challenge against dominant narratives.  
It is here that I think post-structuralism and constructivism coalesce. For if post-
structuralism is concerned with the role of discourse and narratives in establishing our collective 
reality, constructivism is concerned with the individuals who create these discourses and 
narratives, and who are therefore in positions of immense power. Though constructivism is 
found predominantly in the field of international relations, I see no reason why its theoretical 
framework cannot be applied to other levels of political interaction. In international relations, 
while liberals and realists tend to focus on how states interact, constructivists sharpen their unit 
of analysis to the individuals who are in positions of power. Constructivists argue that the best 
way to understand how states behave is to look at the individuals who govern those states, for 
their unique identities and interests are essential to understanding their policy decisions. The 
norms and procedures of international relations are better understood not as institutionalized 
imperatives but as the products of individuals’ interactions with one another. In short, they are 
socially constructed because they are constituted through the social relations of individuals, 
outside of which they could not exist. And if these relations were different, then the norms and 
procedures would also be different. To a constructivist then, there are no institutions that are 
more powerful than the individuals in power, because these individuals are the ones who shape 
how institutions and systems operate. Therefore, individuals are powerful precisely because they 
are in a position to construct the dominant narratives that govern our collective reality. They are 
in a position to determine what gets said, what gets left out, and what gets done (Hay, 2016) The 
principal task of the constructivist is to emphasize that our collective reality is contingent upon 
the reality that the individuals in power construct for us, thus it is essential to interrogate the 
existence of material facts and bring into question the intentions of individuals in power.  
So how do these theories fit into a study of populism? Post-structuralism reveals that our 
world is grounded in the dominant socially constructed narratives of the time, while 
constructivism reveals that existing institutions are constructed by individuals in power. When 
wedded together, a new conceptual framework emerges that concentrates on the way dominant 
narratives and counternarratives are constructed by individuals in positions of power. If we 
conceive of populism as a counternarrative that challenges dominant democratic narratives, we 
must look to the individuals who are constructing these counternarratives because these 
counternarratives are a product of this individual’s interests and biases. Anytime an individual is 
calling for the radical restructuring of political institutions, it is vital to interrogate their interests 
in doing so. It is not unreasonable to suspect that these individuals may restructure a system in 
their favor and position themselves at the helm of a new dominant narrative that they can 
control.    
The first section of this paper can be thought of as a post-structuralist analysis of 
populism. I seek to locate the discursive features that underscore populism and that have made it 
an effective counternarrative. The second section takes a more constructivist approach as I seek 
to look through populist discourses to the individuals who construct them. With a focus on the 
functional role of ‘crisis’, I intend to show that the discursive features of populism are socially 
constructed by the populist. Therefore, the discursive techniques that all populists rely on cannot 
be thought of as “true”, they are simply the best way for populists to justify their radical and 
often corrupt political project. In countries where populists have ascended to the highest political 
office and populism has become a dominant political narrative, we see that these discursive 
features are used to justify corruption and the consolidation of personal power. It is then essential 
that we be able to recognize these discursive features as they emerge because they provide the 
populist with immense political leverage.  
 
 Part I: Literature Review 
 
The study of populism has been marked by three central tendencies. Despite being the 
most conceptually frail, the first tendency has been the most successful in permeating 
mainstream discourse. Here, the tendency is to use the word populism to categorize unusual and 
unfamiliar political phenomena with no regard for the conceptual complexity of the term. Most 
often the term “populism” is used pejoratively to denote some sort of political movement or 
political leader who is seen as a threat to the democratic order.  In these instances, populism 
serves as a convenient catch-all to describe the far-right political leaders who have risen to 
prominence in Europe and the United States in the last decade. As a result of these assumptions, 
populism has often been conflated with what are in fact nationalist, nativist, or radical right 
stances. An essential aim of the academic literature on populism has been to disentangle 
populism from these widespread associations with nationalism, nativism, and the far right. One 
need only spend a short while with the literature to realize that populism exists just as 
prominently on the left, with figures like Hugo Chavez, Juan Peron, Bernie Sanders, and 
countless others. To focus on the policies of European or American populists is to ignore the fact 
that populism emerges in a variety of different forms. It is precisely because of the universality 
of populism - across continents and across the political spectrum - that the phenomenon cannot 
be defined along strictly ideological lines. Rather, a definition must include the more 
fundamental features of populism, the features that are shared by all populists.  
The second tendency in the literature has been to construct a definition of populism that 
reduces the phenomenon to a singular term. In other words, these are attempts to place populism 
into a specific category. This approach has been employed by some of the field’s most renowned 
scholars and has provided some of the most important conceptual foundations for the study of 
populism but it has not yet achieved its goal of unifying populism under a single term.  
 
Populism as a Political Ideology 
 
Cas Mudde’s research has been hailed as groundbreaking for having provided a minimal 
definition for the elusive concept of populism. Mudde has defined populism as a “thin centered 
ideology” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012). Here, the thin-centered ideology of populism exists in 
contrast to “thicker” ideologies like socialism and liberalism which aim to redefine entire 
political concepts and prescribe overarching theories about human societies. He argues that 
because of its limited scope, populism can only arise in conjunction with thicker ideologies. 
Mudde argues that populism as a thin ideology is limited to a set of core principles and ideas that 
divides society into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: the “pure people” and the “corrupt 
elite” (Mudde 2004, 2007).  
Mudde’s most important insight is that populists routinely create an antagonistic frontier 
between a discursively constructed ‘people’ and their oppressors, the ‘corrupt elite’. This 
discursive mechanism is what Laclau and Mouffe have identified as an essential aspect of 
successful social movements. Mudde agrees, seeing it as one of populism’s core principles 
Where Mudde’s approach fails, however is in his labeling of populism. The very nature of the 
distinction between “thick” and “thin” is vague, resisting empirical measurement. Who is to say 
where the thin-ideology of populism ends and the thick-ideology that it is coupled with begins? 
It also raises the question of how “thin” an ideology can be before its loses all conceptual value 
(Moffitt, 2016). In addition, there is little precedent in the field of political science for the term 
“thin-centered ideology”. In his efforts to resolve the ambiguity of populism, Mudde relies on 
another ambiguous term, thus his conceptualization  
 
Populism as a Political Strategy 
 
Kurt Weyland’s understanding of populism is rooted in the same underlying “people vs 
the elite” dynamic as Mudde’s. In his article “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the 
Study of Latin American Politics”, Weyland writes, “ a charismatic leader wins broad 
support...by “representing” people who feel excluded or marginalized from national political life 
and by promising to rescue them from crises, threats, and enemies. The leader appeals to the 
people for help in his heroic effort to regenerate the nation, combat the privileged groups and 
their special interests, and transform the “corrupt” established institutions” (Weyland 2001). 
Again, for Weyland, this relationship between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’ is central to a 
populist’s constructed narrative of reality. The populist mobilizes support by claiming to 
represent the downtrodden and marginalized ‘people’ in a revolt against the established political 
elite. Yet, while Weyland emphasizes the fundamental importance of this dynamic, his definition 
of populism excludes any mention of it.  
Instead, Weyland goes on to define populism as “a political strategy through which a 
personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, 
noninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (Weyland, 
2001). In order to justify his claim that populism is a political strategy, he must focus on how 
populists engage with their supporters. Yet, his definition of populism betrays a regionally-
specific view of populism, with direct, unmediated, and noninstitutionalized support only being 
used by Latin American populists. He does not therefore create a definition that can be applied 
transnationally, as these conditions are not true for European or American populists who have 
risen to prominence in multi-party systems. Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (formerly National 
Front) and Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement would have been impotent had they not 
formalized as a party and ran for political office. In addition, though Donald Trump may have 
used anti-establishment rhetoric, he did not hail from some third-way populist party. He was only 
able to win the 2016 election because he was tied to an established political party. In multiparty 
systems, all politicians - including populist ones - must form or align with established parties to 
wield political influence, therefore they become inherently institutionalized, contrary to 
Weyland’s argument.  
 
Populism as a Political Logic 
 
Any discussion of the literature on populism must include mention of the work of Ernesto 
Laclau, who is held up as a sort of godfather of conceptual populist theory. Laclau, an Argentine 
scholar, developed a discourse-theoretical approach to populism that has had a profound impact 
on the field of study. Laclau conceives of populism as a political logic that rests on three 
principle elements, the leader, the people, and the discourse linking the two. To him, populism 
was the “nature and logics of the formation of collective identity” (Laclau 2005) Crudely, 
speaking Laclau believes that populist logic is a discourse that creates a collective identity 
around a particular political project. It is a discourse carried out by a political figure to build a 
coalition and challenge for political office. Though highly abstract, Laclau’s work has provided a 
detailed map of the linguistic and rhetorical devices that undergird populist discourse. To Laclau 
then, populism is something that is done intentionally, it is a way of constructing reality and 
constructing collective identities that rests on several central and recurring ideas.  
To Laclau, populism cannot exist without a leader, for it is this leader that does the 
populism, thus his focus is on the leaders and the way that they construct reality through 
discourse. This discourse then is the point of study and makes up what populism is.  
Laclau introduces the discursive idea of nodal points. All signifiers in a discourse acquire 
meaning through their relation to the nodal point and it is the nodal point that allows a manifold 
of people to enter into an equivalent political project with one another. It is the central point 
around which all other ideas revolve. For example, in liberalism, the signifier “liberty” serves as 
the nodal point. All other tenets of liberalism, the “state”, the “individual”, and the “society” 
acquire meaning in relation to the nodal point “liberty”. This implies that at the core of all liberal 
discourse exists a collective identity constructed in a particularly liberal way. The same dynamic 
is at play in populist discourse, though in this case, the nodal point is the people. Populists 
construct a collective identity around a ‘people’ and claim to speak for the ‘people’. The ‘people’ 
are a sovereign and morally pure group who have the right to political power.  Populists claim 
that the people have been forcefully oppressed by the existing political establishment. Laclau 
refers to the existing establishment as “the elite”. The people are therefore defined by their 
antagonistic relationship to this “elite’, who are said to have exploited the good “people” and 
undermined democratic institutions. Populism, as a discourse, then provides a constructed 
version of reality that divides society into two camps: a good and an evil. The populist’s project 
is based on the idea that he/she represents the good people and that there is an urgent need to 
overthrow the “elite” in charge, for the elite are responsible for all of the people’s misfortunes 
and can no longer considered legitimate. The issues then are not over specific policies but the 
system and the institutions as a whole, which is why populists call for a revolutionary overhaul 
of the current system with themselves at the helm.  
In line with post-structuralist thinking, Laclau argues that the signifier ‘the people’ is not 
positively defined, meaning it does not correspond with existing socioeconomic markers like the 
poor, the middle-class, coal workers, Latinos, Christians, etc. Rather, signifiers are defined 
differentially, by what they are ‘not’. In the case of ‘the people’, the only feature of their identity 
is that they are not ‘the elite’. This has two effects. First, it leaves ‘the people’ entirely open-
ended, so anyone who self-identifies as not ‘the elite’ can be part of ‘the people’. Second, it 
creates a “chain of equivalence” out of difference. People who are entirely different, with vastly 
different material interests, concerns, and positions in society can become part of the same 
collective identity, purely on the basis that they have been negatively defined in relation to ‘the 
elite’. A frontier is then created between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, and it finds its expression 
through the leader’s articulation of ‘the people’ Laclau sees the process of creating equivalence 
through difference as essential to the success of populism, as it can provide a populist leader with 
a large, emboldened, and diverse support base, all of which are necessary if the populist is to 
validate their claim to represent “the people” as a whole.  
Laclau’s work on populism has been some of the most influential in the field and has 
greatly informed my own understanding of populism. He was one of the first academics to look 
at how populism functions at a discursive level and how populists construct meaning and a 
collective reality through their uniquely populist discourse. If one is to discuss the sufficient 
conditions for identifying populism, Laclau’s “people” and “elite” must be included. That being 
said, many other academics have used Laclau’s foundational ideas as justification for why 
populism should be placed in categories other than “political logic”. In many cases, there are no 
substantial differences between the term “political logic” and the ones formulated by other 
academics. Because of the lack of substantial differences it becomes unclear why one should 
privilege “logic” over any of the other terms, for they are neither mutually exclusive nor 
substantially different. I look to Moffitt’s formulation of populism as a “political style” as 
evidence of this phenomenon.  
 
Populism as a Political Style 
 
 Benjamin Moffitt’s work builds on Laclau’s conceptualization of populism. Moffitt treats 
populism as a discourse that divides society into a ‘people’ and an ‘elite’ but he also sees 
populism as having important non-linguistic features. Attempting to bridge the gap between the 
rhetorical and aesthetic dimensions of populism, Moffitt suggests an understanding of populism 
as a political style. Defining style, as “a repertoire of embodied, symbolically mediated 
performance made to audiences that are used to create and navigate the fields of power” (Moffitt 
2016), Moffitt stresses the performative aspects of populism. While Moffitt insists that his 
conceptualization of populism differs from Laclau’s, it’s important to note that Laclau already 
highlighted the relationship between populism and performance. Laclau writes, “our approach to 
the question of popular identities is grounded precisely in the performative dimension of 
naming… and that populism tries to operate performatively within a social reality” (Laclau 
2005). There appears then to be no substantial difference between Moffitt’s political style 
approach and Laclau’s political logic/discourse approach. 
 Herein lies the problem with this approach to defining populism. Scholars, eager to set 
their definition of populism apart from their colleagues’, have become preoccupied with 
reducing populism to a unique label. Their work then becomes more concerned with validating 
their choice of label then it does with understanding the nature of populism. This preoccupation 
with labeling, clouds the fact that these scholars stand on far more common ground than perhaps 
they realize, or would care to admit. In essence, academics agree about populism’s essential 
ingredients. What you find in Mudde’s, Weyland’s, Laclau’s, and Moffitt’s writing about 
populism are recurring mentions of “the people”, “the elite”, and “the crisis”. All of these 
academics are interested in understanding populism at a discursive level but are also interested in 
separating their definition of populism from previous definitions. Rather than put forth an 
entirely new definition of populism, it is my idea that the discursive features identified by these 
academics should serve as the basis for a new conception of populism. One that does not define 
or classify populism but highlights its discursive content.  
  
The Taxonomical Approach 
 
The third tendency in the scholarly literature arose in opposition to the minimal definition 
approach. This set of scholars resisted the urge to unify populism under a single definition, 
arguing that applying a broad definitional term reduced populism to conceptual vagueness. Their 
approach has therefore been to take the concept of populism and subdivide it, in an attempt to 
systematize all of populism’s various permutations and forms. While the goal was to tidy up 
what was an already jumbled field of definitions and classifications, this approach has only 
contributed more noise to the cacophony.  
Margaret Canovan’s work within this methodology has been the most widely 
acknowledged.  To Canovan, populism arises in two distinct forms: agrarian populism and 
political populism (Canovan 1981). She sees these two forms of populism as being linked by a 
common theme of appeals to a  “people” and a distrust of “elites”. She associates agrarian 
populism with the German, American, and Russian political movements of the 1870s and 1890s 
that arose in opposition to banking elites and urban centers and who called for a better 
representation of farmers in government. She then identifies “political” populism as the kind of 
populism that arose in Latin American governments in the 1960s and 70s. She breaks down 
“political populism” into four further subcategories: populist democracy, populist dictatorship, 
reactionary populism, and politicians populism. What emerges then, is a rather convoluted 
seven-fold taxonomy, in which “politician’s populism” is deemed a subcategory of “political 
populism”, and which offers little to no conceptual clarity. Indeed, Canovan herself expressed a 
disappointment with her typology in 1982, admitting that it “remained frustratingly 
unsystematic” (Canovan 1982).  
Other examples within this approach include classifications of “neopopulism” and 
“classical populism” (Gherghina et. al 2013), Barry Canon’s “left-wing populism” and “right 
wing populism” (Canon 2018),  Mudde and Kaltwasser’s “inclusionary” and “exclusionary” 
populism (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013) and Samuel Handlin’s “polarizing populism” and “non-
polarizing” populism (Handlin 2018). These systematic approaches to classifying populism have 
proven, as Canovan noted in 1982, “frustratingly unsystematic” (Canovan 1982) 
 In attempting to subdivide populism, academics operating within this approach have 
avoided mentioning what populism’s unifying features are. This methodology also has the 
tendency to produce more and more subcategories as populism emerges in new political 
contexts. When a populist figure emerges who does not fit into the existing schema, a new 
subcategory must be created. This has the effect of making the entire systematization more 




In conducting a critical review of the literature on populism, I have tried to show that 
populism is a contested concept that has been subjected to a variety of definitions and 
methodologies. While I have emphasized some of the key differences in populism’s 
conceptualizations, I have also tried to point to some of the key similarities. Though most of the 
scholars in the field disagree on how best to define populism, a synthesis of the literature reveals 
that there is some broad consensus on the common features of populism, namely the antagonistic 
construction of a “people” and an “elite”. I argue that these broadly agreed-upon features should 
serve as the foundation for a new approach. It is to this new approach that I now turn.  
The goal of scholars, regardless of their methodology, has been to construct a universally 
applicable definition of populism so that the phenomenon can be more accurately identified, 
observed, and applied to comparative research. This is ultimately my goal as well. Since defining 
and classifying populism has proven a stubborn task, I propose a new approach to identifying the 
phenomenon. By concentrating primarily on the common features of populism and observing 
how populism manifests itself, rather than trying to pigeonhole into a particular category, we will 
be able to draw valuable insight that will still allow us to recognize populism when we see it. 
Drawing on the scholarly literature that I have already discussed, I will reduce populism to its 
three essential features so as to provide a framework with which to identify the phenomenon. 
These features are in large part based on the discursive understanding of populism laid out by 
Ernesto Laclau and Benjamin Moffitt.    
 
1. The People 
  
 Populists will always claim to represent a homogenous ‘people’. As Laclau notes, this 
‘people’ is never positively defined, it is only negatively defined by its relationship to ‘the elite’. 
In this way, ‘the people’, as a term, is an empty vessel, from which no societal groups are 
explicitly excluded or included. For example, Marine Le Pen has said, “I have come to liberate 
the French from the arrogant people who wish to dictate their behavior to them because I am the 
candidate of the people” (Le Pen 2017). Hugo Chavez has claimed to speak for el pueblo, saying, 
“I am not an individual, I am the people” (AFP 2010). The implication of such claims are that 
‘the people’ are portrayed as the rightfully sovereign, as the only legitimate source of power in a 
representative democracy. The populist, in claiming to represent the will of ‘the people’ is then 
implying that he or she is the only legitimate representative of ‘the people’ and that all who 
oppose the populist are ‘anti-people’ and therefore cannot be legitimate. While these may sound 
like rather innocuous claims, they have far-reaching implications that run contrary to the liberal 
democratic value of pluralism. These statements imply that all other contenders for power are 
illegitimate because they do not serve or represent ‘the people’. Simultaneously, any member of 
the general population who does not identify with their version of ‘the people’, cannot be trusted 
and poses a potential threat to ‘the people’. Populists, are then in essence, anti-pluralists because 
they insist that democracies should be governed by a singular majority, rather than a plurality of 
minorities.  
Since populists must reject pluralism in order to legitimate their own authority, they must 
denounce the legitimacy of institutions, democratic procedures, or other sources of authority. 
Take elections for example. Populist rely on elections in order to justify themselves as the only, 
true voice of ‘the people’. Yet, as the only true voice of ‘the people’, populists cannot concede 
electoral defeats Since no other political candidate is a more credible representative of ‘the 
people’, populists must reject the results of those elections where they suffer defeats. Viktor 
Orban questioned the legitimacy of the 2002 and 2006 Hungarian parliamentary election results, 
which he lost (Adam 2019). And Donald Trump, prior to the 2016 election said, “I’m afraid the 
elections are going to be rigged, I have to be honest” (Trump 2016a). He then declared that he 
would not concede defeat if his opponent won (Adam 2019).  
Democracy emphasizes the eternal sanctity of its own procedures and electoral rules. The 
results of elections must be accepted regardless of the outcome because to denounce the results is 
to denounce the democratic system as a whole. Even in suspicious cases of electoral success, 
candidates will concede defeat. This is perhaps no more apparent than in Al Gore’s concession to 
George Bush in the United States presidential election of 2000, following weeks of legal battles 
that challenged the legitimacy of the results. On the one hand, populist’s must always respect 
electoral legitimation, for how else could they become elected? But on the other hand, populists 
must take any opportunity they can to challenge existing demcratic procedures and norms 
because this is how they legitimize their own anti-status quo campaign. Populists will always 
find ways to denounce the rules of the system while also opening up possibilities for these rules 
to be changed. Electoral results and democratic institutions are presented as subordinate to the 
will of ‘the people’ and the will of the populist. 
 Donald Trump has frequently denounced other sources of authority as well. In 2017, 
Trump lashed out at a federal judge who blocked his executive order restricting Muslim 
immigration. Trump tweeted, ““The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-
enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned!” (@realDonaldTrump 
February 4, 2017) In using the phrase “so-called judge”, Trump questions the legitimacy of the 
judicial branch of the United States government, implying that the institutions as a whole are 
corrupt. Trump, who claims to speak on behalf of ‘the people’, is then further implying that these 
federal institutions are working against the will of ‘the people’. He uses similar strategies in his 
labeling of “fake media”, arguing that those media outlets that oppose him are part of a 
conspiratorial plot to conceal the truth and manipulate the good ‘people’. Such depictions are 
common for populists. They do not merely attack the legitimacy of other politicians, but bring 
into question the legitimacy of democratic institutions as a whole. These institutions, like the 
media or the judicial system, are painted as oppressive and illegitimate systems that marginalize 
‘the people’ and therefore must be torn down and reconstructed.  
A populist project gets its appeal from the radical institutional change that it promises. It 
seeks to “change the terms of political discourse, articulate new social relations, redefine 
political frontiers, and constitute new identities” (Panizza 2005). By supporting a populist, one 
becomes part of a new collective, one whose identity is revolutionary by nature. One feels as if 
one is throwing off one’s oppressive shackles and becoming a protagonist in a larger 
revolutionary movement. The importance of this feeling should not be downplayed, for 
ultimately, all of us yearn to be a part of a movement that affects political change. In short, a 
populist’s invocation of ‘the people’ opens up broad new forms of collective identification, a 
necessary precursor to political mobilization.  
As the articulator of this new form of identification, the name of the leader becomes 
inextricably linked to the collective identity itself. This is part of the reflexive process through 
which the populist names ‘the people’ and then naturally becomes the embodiment of ‘the 
people’. Panizza writes, “if populism can be redefined as a process of naming… the name that 
best fills the symbolic void through which the identification takes place is that of the leader 
himself” (Panizza 2005). This process is apparent in the legacy of Juan Domingo Peron, the 
former President of Argentina, a populist whose name has proven a durable mode of 
identification for decades.  
Juan Domingo Peron created the longest lasting populist project in history. The former 
President of Argentina served three terms and created a brand of populism that continues to 
thrive to this day. The success of Peronism can be explained by Peron’s ability to create an ever-
expanding and evolving collective identity, an identity that has outlived the man by more than 
fifty years. Peron stands as a testament to the power of populist identification and the centrality 
of the populist leader’s name in the construction of that collective identity. 
Peron’s political platform was quintessentially populist. He called for the overthrow of 
Argentina's political establishment, which he identified as being dominated by the bourgeoisie 
and oligarchs. He promised to remove these “enemies of the people” (Beasely-Murray 1998) 
from power and vowed to rid the government of corruption, thus he came to embody anti-
establishment, anti-corruption, and revolutionary values. His platform proved incredibly 
effective in attracting support from a variety of historically disparate social groups, namely the 
Catholic Church, urban workers, rural workers, industrialists, and the labor unions (Conniff 
2012). Peron was able to forge this cross-class and cross-cultural alliance by convincing these 
groups that they faced a common enemy. Though each of these groups faced different 
challenges, Peron was able to blame their suffering on a singular entity: the political elites. Thus, 
by constructing an antagonistic adversary, Peron was able to create a “chain of equivalences” 
that could unite a plurality of social groups under one movement.  
In his book Pensamiento Politico de Peron, Peron writes, “For a Peronist there should be 
nothing better than another Peronist” (Murray 1998). Here, Peronism becomes more than just a 
political movement, it becomes a unifying mode of identification. His name becomes the empty 
signifier to which a plurality of people and demands can be linked. People no longer identify in 
terms of “poor”, “working class”, “middle class”, etc, rather they identify as Peronists. And to be 
a Peronist is to be part of ‘the people’. In forging a collective identity out of his own name, Peron 
created a powerful and politically legitimate coalition that could challenge the established 
political elite. Ultimately, this is what all populists attempt to do. In societies where political 
disillusionment is high, populists offer up a new and radical political identity that challenges the 
system and guarantees change in the name of ‘the people’ and with the name of the leader.  
Peron’s populist project was a success, leveraging popular support to victory in the 1946 
elections.  In 1956, following his two terms in office, Peron was ousted by a military coup and 
exiled. However, despite being removed from power, Peron’s importance as a figurehead 
endured, and Peronism thrived in Argentina. Here the importance of the leader to populism 
becomes quite clear. Even in his absence, Peron remained a symbol of  upward mobility and 
resistance to corruption. His name remained an empty signifier, to which a whole host of 
demands and frustrations could be attached, and on which a collective identity could still be 
based. His followers remained loyal and Peron was restored to power in 1973 
Since Peron’s death in 1974, Peronism has proven a durable mode of identification, and 
to this day remains etched into Argentine politics. Notable leaders like Eduardo Duhalde, Nestor 
de Kirchner, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, and current president Alberto Fernandez have all 
represented the popular Peronist party, Partido Justicialista. Peron’s remains an important 
symbol to Argentines, who still associate the party with his values. The lasting legacy of 
Peronism is indicative of two things. First, that populist modes of identification can be so 
attractive and powerful that they have the ability to last for decades. This would suggest that 
contemporary populists may forge constituencies that will continue to affect politics for a long 
time. For example, future politicians in the United States, recognizing the salience of the Make 
America Great Again movement may choose to associate themselves with Donald Trump as a 
means of garnering support. The second point is that while these populists remain important 
modes of identification, signifiers like Peronism, become increasingly empty and subject to 
redefinition. In Argentina, the Partido Justicialista has undergone countless ideological changes 
as politicians have sought to create new chains of equivalence around the signifier of Peron. 
Peronism has remained a durable mode of identification in name, but beyond this name the 
signifier remains up for reinterpretation. Such modes of identification remain important in their 
name but can be infinitely reworked to suit new chains of equivalence by politicians wishing to 
position themselves in power.  
 
 
2. The Elite 
 
Another essential discursive feature of populism is the construction of ‘the elite’. As has 
already been discussed, populists construct an over-simplified version of society that is divided 
into the good ‘people’ and the corrupt ‘elite’. This divide has been widely acknowledged across 
the academic literature on populism. Who ‘the elite’ are varies across each political context, with 
Latin American populists often attacking the bourgeoisie and upper class rulers, European 
populists criticizing the European Union, and in the case of Donald Trump the ‘elite’ are 
portrayed as a kind of shadowy, corrupt, and self-interested leftist political ‘elite. Populists may 
also speak against particular ‘Others’ - particularly minorities, immigrants, or refugees - but 
these ‘Others’ will always be linked back to an established ‘elite’ (Moffitt 2016). For example, in 
the case of Viktor Orban, it was argued that the EU were responsible for the influx of refugees to 
Hungary in 2015, and were therefore unconcerned with the safety and security of the Hungarian 
people. Orban was then able to justify his criticism of the EU by portraying them as an 
antagonistic ‘Other’. 
 Though who the ‘elite’ are varies from populist to populist, the distinction between them 
and ‘the people’ is always a moral one. Rather than confront their opponents  - real or not  - in a 
rational and logical way, populists label their opponents as fundamentally evil, reinforcing a kind 
of Manichean view of the world (Hawkins 2009). Hugo Chavez said that “we are in the times of 
the Apocalypse. You can no longer be on the side of the evil and the side of God” (Moffitt 2016) 
He also speaks of confronting “the Devil himself” and labeling his opposition as “frijolitos 
(pipsqueaks)” who are “not just incompetent” but “irresponsible, liars, un-patriots, without any 
sense of honor or responsibility” (Hawkins 2009). This is what separates populism from other 
forms of politics. While it is common for politicians to speak for an ‘American people’ or a 
‘French people’, these claims are not coupled with claims that other sources of power are 
essentially evil and illegitimate. Most politicians do no bring into the question the moral standing 
or legitimacy of their opponents.  Nor do they attack the existing institutions in the ways that 
populists do. Moral distinctions like these serve to legitimize the populists claim that ‘the people’ 
are the only source of legitimate power, and therefore the populist, as the embodiment of ‘the 
people’ is the only source of legitimate power. In essence, by demonizing another portion of the 
population, this helps ‘the people’ constitute its own cohesion and legitimize itself (Brading 
2012). This is because every pole in a binary acquires its meaning through its relation to the 
opposite pole. The creation of a collective “We” requires the creation of a ‘Them” in order to 
define the “We”.  
Once populists get into positions of power, their policies must make good on their 
promises to improve the lives of ‘the people’ but they must also make good on their promises to 
weaken or overthrow ‘the elite’. As a result, populists can justify policies that disenfranchise or 
marginalize those they see as the opposition. Usually these policies take shape in the form of 
new constitutions, new rule-making laws, and institutional changes. Hugo Chavez, for example, 
was successful in writing a new Bolivarian Constitution that abolished the presidential term 
limit, removed his opposition from their public posts, replacing them his loyalists, and then 
created a new unicameral legislature that he stacked in his favor (Weyland 2013). He was able to 
justify such radical policies on the basis  hat those who opposed him were corrupt and 
illegitimate and needed to be marginalized. There is a palpable irony to this. In order to justify 
his own corrupt methods of consolidating power, Chavez argued that he was ridding the system 
of corruption, essentially manufacturing the very problems that he promised to fix. Since 
populists cannot cooperate with the evil ‘elite’, policies must be designed to direct existing 
power away from ‘the elite’ and into the hands of the populist. In this sense, hegemony becomes 
the only solution to the problem of the evil ‘elite’.    
To summarize, populism is inherently antagonistic, for it is antagonism that defines who 
‘the people’ are and who their enemies are. On the one hand, this is not an inherently dangerous 
philosophy, it can be seen as just another way of mobilizing support and catalyzing political 
change. That being said, we must recognize, that historically, populists have enacted policies that 
have concentrated power in their own hands. This is because, populism, with its antagonistic 
worldview is not merely concerned with locating the enemy but also defeating them. 
Cooperation with ‘the elite’ is seen as impossible. The only way to defeat ‘the elite’, even if they 
do not exist in a material sense, is to rewrite the rules of the system so that power remains firmly 
in the hands of the populist. What allows them to carry out these hegemonic policies is their 
symbolic association with the morally pure  ‘people’. By claiming to represent ‘the people’ the 
populist can argue that he or she is consolidating power in the name of the people, and that even 
institutional forms must be restructured so that ‘the people’ can be liberated from oppression.  
There is something of a paradox at the heart of democracy, and it is within the folds of 
this paradox that populism is born and thrives. The founding principle of every democracy is that 
sovereignty resides in the people. A democracy’s constitution represents an attempt to organize 
and protect the people, in this sense a constitution is written for the people, and symbolically by 
the people. Maurice Duverger wrote, “It is the constitution that derives its authority from the 
constituent power and not the constituent power that derives its authority from the constitution” 
(Duverger 1948) Governments and institutions acquire their juridical authority only through this 
constitution, therefore, the people can be seen to have ultimate authority over the government. 
And the constituent power of the people is their greatest power. In a democracy, the will of the 
people is always legal, therefore, the people may change constitutions and adjust rules whenever 
and however they please. “This is a right of which no positive institution can ever deprive them” 
(Wilson 1787). To take this right away would be to oppress the will of the people. In short, the 
rules themselves should never prevent the people from being able to change the rules if they so 
please.  
But how does one define the will of the people? Representative democracy cannot 
guarantee unmediated political action by ‘the people’, it is a form of political organization 
through which individuals are viewed as representatives of ‘the people’. This is a strange idea. 
The most sovereign body in a democracy can never exist in a material sense, nor can it speak for 
itself or constitute itself. To be constituted, ‘the people’ requires mediation and representation on 
the part of an individual Most representatives are pluralists, meaning they do not claim to speak 
for ‘the people’ as a collective, merely a portion of the population. However, it is possible for an 
individual to make the claim that he or she represents the sovereign people in their totality. And 
these claims can gain some credibility when this individual is supported by the majority of the 
electorate. At the point where this individual wins an election with some majority of support, the 
claim that he or she represents ‘the people’ becomes even more credible.  
Here, we get to the nature of this democratic paradox. Any person who is “seen” by ‘the 
people’ to be the representative of ‘the people’, can justify their actions as the will of ‘the 
people’. However, because the will of the people can never exist materially, it is replaced by the 
will of the representative, as the two become one and the same. Since constitutions are 
subordinate to the will of the people, then previous constitutions, if they are deemed undesirable 
by the “will of the people” must be replaced with a new constitution that reflects their new will. 
This is the sovereign right of the people. A new constitution can be written that codifies the 
writer of the constitution as the legitimate supreme authority in the new republic and designates 
themselves as the constituent power (Kalyvas 2005). Paradoxically, democracy, by giving 
ultimate sovereign power to the will of the people, gives individuals who claim to represent the 
people, the sovereign power to act undemocratically. 
To speak in the name of the people is to speak the language of power (Näsström 2007) 
because in a democracy ultimate power resides in the people. The existence of a stable 
democracy is founded on the assumption that it is logically impossible for the people, and their 
will, to crystallize as one. Populism shows that there are holes in this assumption and awakens in 
‘the people’ the realization that they have a right to impose their will on the system. However, 
their will cannot be divorced from the will of the populist. Individuals are capable of generating 
the will of the people in order to foster new claims for legitimacy. When this individual receives 
support, then in some sense they become rightfully sovereign and legitimate in the eyes of 
‘people’ who are the ultimate legitimating force. Existing laws and institutions can then become 
illegitimate and can be subordinated to the will of the individual. This is how populists are able 
to justify the writing of new constitutions and the restructuring of entire democracies. Hannah 
Arendt, warned of the dangerous fiction that the people could be ever represented as one. She 
denounced the idea of the people’s sovereignty, arguing that it had the totalitarian effect of 
destroying the plurality of the public space (Kalyvas 2005). Populism, with its anti-pluralist and 
sovereign claims, stands then as a very real challenge to existing democratic structures, 
particularly in countries where checks and balances are tenuous and where citizens feel as if their 
demands are not being heard.  
 
3. The Crisis  
 
 The “Us vs Them” relationship between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ is widely 
acknowledged in the academic literature, A feature of populism that is far less emphasized 
though, is crisis. We can think of crisis as a necessary and logical consequence of populist 
discourse. Anyone who subscribes to the idea that the nation is governed by an evil “elite’ who 
are oppressing the good ‘people’ must logically conclude that they are in the midst of a political 
crisis (Rooduijn 2014) Here, it becomes clear how these three discursive mechanisms interact 
with one another and reinforce one another. “The people’ cannot be divorced from ‘the elite’ but 
the people cannot be mobilized without a crisis.  The remainder of this paper is devoted to the 
concept of crisis and populism’s inextricable relationship to crisis. In a populist’s narrative, the 
construction of ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ can be seen as creating the cast of characters. 
However, on their own, the characters in a narrative are static, they require some sort of catalyst, 
a plot device, to spur them to action. This is the role that crisis plays, and any discursive analysis 
of populism must include mention of the leader’s construction and perpetuation of crisis. 
 So what do we mean when we talk about crisis? Reinhart Koselleck has provided a 
valuable conception of crisis that is rooted in the term’s Greek etymological and historical usage. 
He sees crisis as a rather ambiguous term, that expresses a new sense of time which both 
indicates and intensifies the end of an epoch (Koselleck and Richter 2006). In this way, crises are 
decisive and unique moments in history, that precipitate “a transition towards something better or 
worse or towards something altogether different” (Koselleck and Richter 2006). Crises then, are 
situations that necessitate immediate action, radical change, and typically come with a challenge 
to some established authority. If there is no action, the future will descend into something much 
worse or, at the very least, something very different. In contemporary usage, crisis is constructed 
out of some sort of systemic failure - either economic, social, or political - and the impetus to act 
comes from the need to correct these failures (Moffitt 2016).  
 A populist’s political project is always centered around some systemic failure or failures. 
To name a few, Geert Wilders has focused on the failure of Muslim immigration in the 
Netherlands. Viktor Orban and Marine Le Pen have addressed the EU’s failure to deal with the 
influx of refugees from Africa and the Middle East. Hugo Chavez attacked the failures of the 
ruling elite to help the poor and working classes in Venezuela. But failure is not enough to 
necessitate the radical change that populists call for, it is not sufficient for signaling the end of an 
epoch and depicting the present as a decisive moment in history. No, populists must instead 
elevate these failures to something more severe, a crisis. The failure to deal with immigrants is 
elevated to a crisis of safety and security. The failure to help the poor is escalated to a crisis of 
corruption and illegitimacy. These crises, of corruption, legitimacy, or security have a kind of 
homogenizing effect, in that they can encompass any and all of ‘the people’s’ grievances. You 
can’t find a job? You can’t afford to pay for healthcare to cover your medical bills? You don’t 
feel as if your political representatives are listening to you? It’s because the system is corrupt. In 
this way, broad systemic crises can be used to explain a whole host of disparate failures. People 
will then find it very easy to identify with a populist’s crisis and accept it’s existence as material 
fact because it offers an oversimplified explanation for their frustrations. 
The existence of crisis also serves to strengthen the populist’s dichotomization of ‘the 
people’ and ‘the elite’, in that it assigns these two groups the roles of ‘victim’ and ‘culprit’. ‘The 
elite’ are naturally the ones responsible for the crisis and the ones least affected by its existence. 
The ruling elite are presented as the ones who have designed the institutions to marginalize ‘the 
people’ and benefit themselves. This is indicative of populist’s general refusal to deal with great 
complexity, rather they prefer to reduce problems to the fault of a singular adversary. Such an 
oversimplified problem then only requires an oversimplified solution, namely the removal of the 
enemy and the restructuring of their poisonous institutions by ‘the people’. Term limits and 
systems of checks and balances can be presented as part of the democratic crisis, thus the crisis 
can offer a seemingly objective rationale for removing ‘the elites’ from their positions of power 
and restructuring the democratic institutions in their entirety.  
If the nation was in a state of equilibrium, or it was at least seen to be in equilibrium by 
the general public, it would be difficult for a populist to justify their radical democratic changes. 
Take the rewriting of a constitution for example. It seems unlikely that the general public would 
be interested in a new or modified constitution if there were no impending threats or dangerous 
external circumstances. A country must then feel as if its back is against the wall for such drastic 
institutional change to be considered a viable option. Populists, with their radical attacks against 
the establishment and calls to rewrite the constitution, must then find a way to justify such 
claims. Crisis, then, becomes the best way to galvanize the support of the people. For claiming 
that the entire system is in peril is the best way to justify changing the entire system. John Elster 
has shown empirically that most new constitutions are written in the “wake of a crisis or 
exceptional circumstance of some sort” (Elster 1995). He points out that paradoxically “the task 
of constitution-making generally emerges in conditions that are likely to work against good 
constitution-making” (Elster 1995). Elster remarks that while the demand for a new constitution 
generally emerges during turbulent times and new constitutions are then written in these 
turbulent times, constitutions ought to be written in times of social and political calm. 
For a populist to be successful it is absolutely necessary that they depict the present as a 
decisive moment in history, where the fate of the nation and democracy hang in the balance. In 
the words of Koselleck, populists must present their own campaign as the dawn of a new epoch, 
the birth of a new regime because tearing down the old establishment cannot be justified unless it 
is deemed to be absolutely necessary. Once again this kind of Manichean view of the world is 
presented, one in which a cosmic struggle between the good ‘people’ and the bad ‘elite’ has 
culminated at a singular point in history.  
 




 In the following sections I will incorporate constructivism into my analysis of populism, 
hoping that it will shed more light on the contingency of its central discursive features. 
Constructivism is a school of political thought that is uniquely concerned with the power 
relations between political actors and the general public (or plebs as they have been historically 
referred to in political theory). The central tenet of constructivism is that we, the plebs reach our 
understanding of the political through the political actors that we subscribe to, therefore our 
conception of political “realities” cannot be divorced from the information that is given to us by 
those actors. The consequence of this insight is that our sense of what is objective is a product of 
what political actors tell us is objective, thus our objective realities are fundamentally subjective 
in that they are contingent upon the narratives that these actors construct for us. It is the job of 
the constructivist to emphasize the contingency on which our reality is based and to question the 
intentions and interests of political actors. 
To a constructivist, power is “the capacity to resolve interpretive ambiguity 
authoritatively” (Hay 2016). This means an individual is powerful if they are in a position to 
shape how others view reality. To give an example, the individuals who write textbooks are 
powerful in the sense that they have the capacity to resolve the ambiguity of history in a 
seemingly objective way. To present their subjective interpretation as objective reality is what 
makes them powerful for they are shaping what others will accept as fact. To give a 
contemporary political example, the Bush Administration's decision to invade Iraq in the wake of 
9/11, was contingent upon the subjective narrative that Saddam Hussein was harboring weapons 
of mass destruction. In their ability to depict this narrative as objective fact, the Administration 
was able to justify a decision that had massive global consequences. A constructivist would 
argue, that the Bush Administration was not powerful in a realist sense, meaning they had a 
powerful military at their disposal, but that they were powerful because they were able to shape 
what got said and what got done. The constructivist would then also interrogate why the Bush 
Administration portrayed reality in this way with the intention of revealing more about the 
broader interests of these actors.  
In the same way that textbook authors stitch together narratives about the past, or that the 
Bush Administration promulgated a narrative about Saddam Hussein’s WMDs, populists create 
narratives about the state of a democracy. As I have shown, this populist narrative is founded 
upon three essential discursive elements: ‘the people’, ‘the elite’, and ‘the crisis’. Constructivism 
reveals to us that, as elements of an individual’s subjective narrative, these features cannot be 
objectively true. ‘The people’ and ‘the elite’ do not exist outside of a populist’s articulation, and 
by extension, the crisis that necessitates the ‘the people’ to rise up against ‘the elite ‘ cannot be 
regarded as objective fact. Rather, these elements are part of a subjective narrative that claims to 
represent reality objectively. These three elements are social constructions but this doesn’t mean 
they cannot be subjectively true. They are “true” insomuch as people believe them to be “true”. 
Therefore, what makes a populist successful- or any political actor for that matter - is their ability 
to construct a narrative that is compelling, credible, and relatable. To support a populist, one 
must accept their narrative of reality, and its discursive constructions as objective fact.  
Since the discursive features of populism are part of a narrative that condemns the 
political establishment and promises profound political change it is important to interrogate how 
this narrative may suit the larger interests of the populists themselves. Constructivism separates 
the narratives that political actors give us from objective fact and emphasizes the inherent 
subjectivity of such narratives. Therefore, the question emerges why does the populist create 
such an antagonistic and anti-status quo narrative. How do the constructions of ‘the people’, ‘the 
elite’, and ‘the crisis’ serve their own personal interests?   
In the following section I will dive more deeply into the concept of crisis with the 
intention of revealing its socially-contingent and constructed nature. I intend to show that crises 
do not exist in any real sense, rather crises are the products of narratives that are inherently 
subjective and constructed. I intend to show that populism is inextricably linked to crisis and that 
it is in the populist’s best interest to perpetuate the existence of crisis once they get into office. 
For it is the existence of crises that justifies their radical efforts to consolidate power. What 
emerges then is a state in which crisis is normalized and perpetual and from which ‘the people’ 
cannot escape.  
 
The Subjectivity of Crisis 
 
 It has long been alleged in the literature on populism that crises, be that economic, 
social, or political are essential for the emergence of populism. Academics have often argued this 
point, identifying a causal relationship between crisis and populism in which crises act as “a kind 
of trigger or a necessary precondition of populism” (Moffitt 2016). Kirk Hawkins writes, 
“Populist parties and leaders are almost always present in every country, but they typically rise to 
prominence in moments of crisis” (Hawkins 2009) Laclau argues that populism could not 
emerge without the preexistence of a crisis, as he sees crises as providing the only opportunity 
for populists to challenge existing institutions and change the terms of political discourse (Laclau 
2005).  
 Scholars who subscribe to this point of view might explain populism’s recent success in 
Europe by pointing to the ongoing “refugee crisis.” They might argue that the massive influx of 
refugees from the Middle East and Africa is evidence of a sociopolitical crisis, that has, in turn, 
triggered the rise of populist politicians. To interrogate this point, it’s worth questioning if the 
“refugee crisis” - as it’s been referred to in popular discourse -  is objectively a crisis in the first 
place. Yes, there has been a considerable influx of refugees coming into Europe in recent years - 
with more a million arriving just in 2015 alone - this is a material fact, but are these numbers 
really indicative of a crisis? To the 35% of Germans, 39% of French, and 29% of Brits who feel 
that immigrants are “a burden on their country”, these numbers may indeed justify the existence 
of a crisis, either a political, economic, or social one. But, to the 59% of Germans, 56% of 
French, and 62% of Brits (Gonzalez-Barrera and Philip 2020) who see immigrants as “making 
our country stronger” the material fact that more than a million refugees have arrived in Europe 
is likely not perceived as crisis. Clearly then, if the majority of the population do not believe that 
the crisis exists then the existence of the crisis cannot be treated as objective fact and cannot be 
considered a necessary precondition for populism. As it does not make sense to make causal 
arguments about things that cannot be empirically measured and whose very existence can be 
brought into question. 
What this reveals is that crises are not objective phenomena, rather they are post hoc 
narratives that seek to explain the occurrence of events as symptomatic of larger systemic 
problems. One person may take the objective fact that there have been more than a million 
refugees arriving in Europe and explain this fact by pointing to the incompetence of European 
governments to deal with these refugees. Another person may explain this influx as a logical 
consequence of globalization, multiculturalism, and the increasing prevalence of civil wars in the 
Middle East and Africa. Both people have then constructed their own subjective explanations for 
the “refugee crisis”, building a post hoc narrative that suits their understanding of causality. We 
can do little to question the validity of each of these subjective claims, in some sense they are as 
equally valid as they are invalid, as reality can sustain multiple contradictory versions 
simultaneously. 
One would think that certain kinds of events, by their very nature, limit the credibility of 
crisis narratives. Environmental disasters are a good example because their existence is 
objective, therefore to deny their existence or to deny the extent of their damage would not make 
for a particularly credible narrative. That being said, the way such disasters unfold can be 
incorporated into narratives that point to larger systemic problems. Such an instance unfolded in 
the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, where the federal government and New Orleans officials 
came under fire for their response to the emergency. Leaders of the African American 
community spoke out against what they perceived to be a systemic unwillingness by the federal 
government to evacuate poor African Americans from New Orleans. The narrative quickly took 
hold, with an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll showing that 7 out of 10 African American 
respondents felt the Bush Administration would have responded with more urgency in New 
Orleans if the victims had been in white suburbs rather than a predominantly black inner city 
(Sandalow 2005). Now, nearly 15 years later, the lasting narrative from Hurricane Katrina is one 
of institutionalized racism. What this shows is that even events like natural disasters can be 
folded in larger crisis narratives.  
It is vital that we interrogate the notion of crisis from a constructivist approach. As I have 
said, crises are constructions, narratives that resolve the ambiguity surrounding a series of events 
by linking them to a singular crisis. This construction, explaining how and why things came to 
be, is integral to how a “crisis” is lived and experienced by the people subscribing to it. The 
ability to affect how reality is experienced thus constitutes an immense amount of power as it 
sets the conditions for what is said, what is left unsaid, and what is to be done (Hay 2016). By 
constructing a crisis as a particular kind of crisis, political actors are opening doors to solutions 
that may suit their own agenda and closing doors to solutions that may not be in their interests. 
They are in a position to establish the terms and conditions for discourse. We must recognize that 
the construction of crisis may tell us more about the interests of the political actors involved in 
that construction than it does about the actual existence of the crisis. 
Populism, more than any other political phenomenon, is inextricably linked to crisis. 
Contrary to what Laclau, Hawkins and other scholars have argued though, populists do not 
simply react to crisis, rather they actively construct crises and perpetuate a sense of crisis to 
serve their own interests. This is a common feature of all populist movements. In the previous 
section, I discussed the role that crisis plays in reinforcing the dichotomization of ‘the people’ 
and ‘the elite’ and justifying a populist’s claim to power. In this way, crisis can serve the 
interests of the populist during their political campaigns. This point appears occasionally in the 
academic literature. A point that is understudied, however, is the way that populists perpetuate 
crises once they get into office. While one might expect that it is in the interests of the populist to 
resolve the crisis they campaigned on, in fact, the opposite is true. Populists remain deeply 
committed to their crisis and once they achieve political power, the construction of crisis 
becomes more pronounced. I intend to explain this phenomenon by demonstrating that the 
perpetuation of crisis narratives is precisely what allows the populist to subvert the system and 
consolidate their own power.   
 
Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution 
 
Let us turn us first turn to a paradigmatic populist: Hugo Chavez. The antagonistic 
rhetoric of Chavez’s 1998 election campaign was aimed at the Punto Fijo institutional structure. 
In 1958, the framework for Venezuela’s democracy was established in the “Punto Fijo” pact, an 
agreement that spelled out a power sharing agreement between the three primary political parties, 
Accion Democratica(AD), COPEI, and Union Republicana Democratica (URD). This agreement 
to share power was explicitly codified in the 1961 Venezuelan constitution. However, in 1968, 
the URD lost its influence by a narrow margin and henceforth, a bipartite political system 
emerged in which COPEI and AD controlled all of Venezuela's political institutions. In 1992, 
Hugo Chavez began his crusade against the Punto Fijo institutional order. He pointed to the 
Punto Fijo bipartite system as the enemy of the people, calling it corrupt and evil and blaming it 
for Venezuela’s economic plight. He said in a speech,  
 
‘To constitute a new assembly is a must...it is vital for the country; precisely because, in 
the last forty years the political system in Venezuela lost the democratic essence, 
legitimacy...And it doesn’t have the framework to drive the nation to act accordingly with critical 
issues...Peacefully and democratically ‘We’ shall do it - not because any caudillo, autocrat, or 
elite sector want to but the sovereign ‘Venezuelan People’” (Brading 2012).  
 
In this excerpt, the essential features of populism are spelled out quite clearly. There is a 
an appeal to and construction of a “Venezuelan People”, a labelling of the enemy ‘ -  the 
caudillos -  and the construction of a crisis of legitimacy and democracy. Chavez’s crisis then 
was not simply one of representation, it was a crisis of the system as a whole. He constructed a 
radical political project that “campaigned for the displacement of discredited institutional 
structure  and the formation of a popular institutional framework” (Brading 2012). It was through 
this construction of crisis that Chavez was able to justify his calls for a new constitution and the 
birth of a new regime. Without the existence of a crisis such claims would have sounded 
preposterous. 
Since he first emerged as a political candidate, Hugo Chavez’s crisis narrative was 
constructed around the idea of a democratic system in peril, one that had been poisoned by 
corruption. He then positioned his campaign as part of a decisive moment in Venezuelan history, 
a last chance to overhaul the corrupt system. For him, a new constitution, and other fundamental 
changes to the system were necessary for eradicating corruption. After Chavez’s victory in the 
election - which he won with 56% of the vote (Brading 2012) - he immediately set about 
dismantling the Punto Fijo institutions and replacing them with his own so-called “Bolivarian 
Republic” (Brading 2012). Between 1999 and 2000, Chavez established a Constituent Assembly 
and was successful in getting approval for a new constitution via a public referendum. These 
policies were both intended to increase popular participation and give a political voice to the 
poor, working, and middle classes. However, such progressive policies were limited and Chavez 
quickly turned to consolidating his own power. 
The new constitutional framework that was established explicitly removed Punto Fijo 
representatives from their public posts and replaced them with Chavez loyalists. He quickly 
closed the bicameral Congress, where his opposition held the majority of seats. Then, thanks to a 
reengineered electoral system and more referendums, created a new unicameral national 
legislature that was dominated by his loyal followers. With a stacked legislature, he then passed 
a law that eliminated the ban on consecutive terms and gave himself presidential authorization to 
decree laws in six key areas without parliamentary support: the economy, transport, service 
infrastructure, science and technology, reorganization of government ministries, and crime. By 
2000, only two years after his election, Chavez had successfully seized control of all branches of 
government, eliminated his opposition, and guaranteed his own indefinite reelection (Weyland 
2013).  
Ironically, while Chavez consolidated his own power through corruption, he continued to 
argue that there were a network of corrupt elites conspiring against him. He continued to 
perpetuate the crisis of corruption because it afforded him the opportunity to further consolidate 
his own power. He called them “alcoholics, demagogues, corrupters, tyrants, repressors, 
murderers, and all those who sucked on that tit” and therefore justified the further consolidation 
of his own power to resist their nefarious ways. He went on to say, “this is a government with no 
compromise that doesn’t subordinate to any faction regardless of its weight” (Brading 2012). 
When he’d exhausted this conspiracy theory, he broadened his scope, arguing that the United 
States were colluding with his opposition and undermining the sovereignty of the Bolivarian 
Republic. Following an attempted coup d’etat against him, he said “George Bush has changed 
orders to his pawns...They have started a new plot. I don’t blame the dogs but the owners of the 
dogs, the American government… this conspiracy of the Empire” (Brading 2012).  
Chavez’s approach to consolidating power rested on two principles, both of which were 
linked to the populist narrative he had always espoused. First, he relied heavily on plebiscitary 
mass support, in the form of referendums, to transform Venezuela’s institutions. In doing so, he 
could argue that the institutional changes were in the name of el pueblo and part of the general 
will of ‘the people’. Second, no matter how much power he concentrated in his own hands, he 
continued to argue that the system was in crisis, insisting that corrupt elites were still conspiring 
against him. This had the effect of justifying further consolidations of power, under the guise of 
progressive policies, while simultaneously reinforcing his construction of the “enemy”. This is 
an essential point. Even when populist get into the highest positions of power, they continue to 
perpetuate crisis narratives, either using the same ones or generating new ones. These are not 
then temporary crises with quick solutions, they are presented as deep-rooted crises that will take 
years to fix, thus justifying indefinite reelection. The crises are initially presented as transitional 
or temporary during elections, but once in power, they are revealed to be far more complicated 
and entrenched.  
The crisis-driven model that Chavez relied on became the blueprint for Latin American 
populists. In Bolivia, President Evo Morales and his Movement Towards used trumped-up 
charges of corruption and administrative irregularities against opposition politicians, imprisoning 
some and driving many others out of the country. In doing so, Morales has been able to stack the 
judicial branch in his favor. Argentina’s President, Carlos Menem used “emergency decrees” to 
bend constitutional rules, pack Argentina’s Supreme Court with his supporters, protecting his 
consolidation of power. A similar situation unfolded in Nicaragua, where Daniel Ortega publicly 
extracted concessions from an opposition leader in order to prove to the public that corrupt 
politicians still had a grasp on the political institutions. He used this confession as justification 
for packing the judicial branch in his favor and having his appointees exempt him from the 
constitution’s ban on reelection (Weyland 2013).  
Latin American populists are not the only ones who continue to perpetuate crises when 
they get into positions of power. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is the best example of a 
European populist who has deployed crisis narratives as a means of consolidating his power and 
establishing a new political regime, similar to Chavez’s Bolivarian Republic. In the following 
section I will address the three crisis narratives that Orban has been most successful in 
dramatizing and exploiting for personal gain: the 2006 Hungarian corruption crisis, the 2008 




Viktor Orban’s first term as Prime Minister (1998-2002) showed early traces of populism 
and narratives of crisis. Coming to power in the wake of the 1998 post-communist transition, 
Orban frequently blamed the Hungarian establishment for failing to depose the communist 
‘nomenklatura’ elite and often characterized his politics as a fight against the prevailing 
communist system. Orban attempted to centralize his own power during his first term, pointing 
to the need to neutralize the nefarious elite as justification, but he was largely unsuccessful in 
restructuring the Hungarian institutional order.  
Following a political scandal in 2006, in which the Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany 
publicly admitted to lying during his electoral campaign and confessed to government 
corruption, Orban seized the opportunity to run again for political office. Orban and his party 
Fidesz-KDNP, perpetuated a narrative of a democratic system in crisis, calling for the removal of 
Hungary’s elite from office and the need for a regime change (Illés et al. 2018) He integrated the 
2006 corruption scandal into a wider discourse of crisis, raising questions about the legitimacy of 
the existing constitution and calling for the codification of a new one. The campaign was an 
unprecedented success, with Orban and Fidesz winning a two-thirds majority in parliament in the 
2010 elections, having discursively identified themselves as the party of the people. With a 
supermajority in parliament, Hungarian law permitted the rewriting of the constitution. An 
opportunity Orban could not pass up. To him, the rewriting of the constitution signaled the 
genesis of a new regime and a new political order for the Hungarian people. Following his 
electoral victory Orban addressed the nation saying, “Today in Hungary we learned a historical 
lesson...that is the lesson of the regime change, and that is as follows: it is impossible to change a 
regime, a regime can only be brought down and overthrown, overthrown and replaced by a new 
one” (Szilágyi and Bozóki 2015.).   
The rewriting of the constitution was not only symbolic, it was immensely practical as it 
provided Orban with an opportunity to weaken and delegitimize the established political elite by 
centralizing power in his own hands. Perhaps the most significant changes brought on by this 
constitutional reform were changes that Orban made to Hungary's parliament. Orban gave the 
majority party - his own party - the ability to pass any legislation without the need for a coalition 
partner, as was law under the previous regime. In practice, this turned Orban’s popular majority 
into an unchallengeable absolute majority (Illés et al. 2018) Here we see that by identifying the 
2006 corruption scandal as symptomatic of a larger institutional crisis, Viktor Orban justified the 
writing of new constitution, which in turn, allowed him to strengthen the power of the Prime 
Minister, limit the power of the opposition, and construct a new regime based on hyper-
centralization of state power.  
Viktor Orban has also been effective in creating post hoc narratives about the 2008 
financial crisis that linked the financial anomaly to larger political failures, both within Hungary 
and outside. He used the global financial crisis as evidence of a failing economic model, ‘the fall 
of scientific capitalism’ (Illés et al. 2018) as he called it, for which the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Commission, and the Hungarian National bank were all complicit in and 
responsible for. In making these claims, he justified domestic economic reform that would 
protect Hungary against the nefarious supranational entities that were responsible for the 
economic struggles of his “people’. First, he introduced “crisis taxes” on several sectors 
including banking, energy, telecommunications, and advertising. These ‘crisis taxes’ were 
merely a convenient way for Orban to bring in new money for his regime and reduce his budget 
deficit, they were not the methods of economic stabilization that he claimed them to be. To 
defend against the supranational forces of evil and their economic meddling, Orban has also 
justified putting key sectors under state control. In 2017 he said, “A country the size of 
Hungary...can only be strong if there is robust majority national ownership in the strategic 
industries which determine its fate” (Orban 2017). Of these industries, none is more ‘strategic’ 
than the telecommunications and media industry, which has become increasingly nationalized 
and put under Orban’s control. Countless media outlets have been transferred to a central holding 
company ran by Orban loyalists, giving the regime power to regulate media competition and 
content (Howard 2014). Though Hungary was relatively unaffected by the 2008 financial crisis, 
Orban has dramatized the scope of the crisis in order to generate more capital for his regime, 
expand state power, and silence his opposition through control of the media.  
Orban’s third crisis narrative capitalized on the “refugee crisis” of 2015. Initially, Orban 
linked the migration crisis to the rise of organized crime and terrorism, arguing that immigrants 
posed a threat to the economy, culture, and security of Hungary. To signal the imminence of the 
crisis and the gravity of the situation, he raised the terror threat level in March of 2016. Then, as 
the situation progressed, Orban’s narrative shifted to an assault on the EU’s response to the 
influx of migrants and refugees, denouncing the supranational body as useless and undemocratic. 
In 2016 Orban said, 
 
 “If we want to stop this mass migration, we must first of all curb Brussels. The main 
danger to Europe’s future does not come from those who want to come here, but from Brussels’ 
fanatics of internationalism. We cannot allow Brussels to place itself above the law. We shall not 
allow it to force upon us the bitter fruit of its cosmopolitan immigration policy. We shall not 
import to Hungary crime, terrorism, homophobia, and synagogue-burnining anti-Semitism. 
There shall be no urban districts beyond the reach of the law, there shall be no mass disorder or 
immigrant riots here and there shall be no gangs hunting down our women and daughters” 
(Orban March 15, 2016) 
 
Orban’s policy responses to the crisis were vastly disproportionate to the number of 
migrants who saught asylum in Hungary but the policies he enacted served to legitimize his 
crisis narrative and stoke fear in Hungarians. He initiated legal action against the EU’s migrant 
resettlement quota plan, constructing a fence along its Serbian border and closing its Croatian 
border, tightened the legal requirements for asylum seekers, and approved increased emergency 
powers for the federal government in the case of a terrorist attack. Ultimately, though these 
policies were arguably excessive, Orban was successful in swaying public opinion on the issue. 
Studies show that in autumn of 2016, 68% of Hungarians felt that migration was the single most 
important issue facing the EU (European Commission 2015) and xenophobia increased 
(Simonovits et al. 2016). It is clear then that crisis narratives like the ones constructed by Orban 
can have a profound impact on public opinion and can influence electoral decisions.  
Orban’s dramatization of the immmigration crisis justified increasing both his power vis-
a-vis Hungary and his power vis-a-vis Europe . First, his rejection of immigrants served to 
strengthen the collective identity of his constituency. The perpetuation of the “us-vs-them” (“us” 
being both immigrants and Europeans) reinforced his identification with a distinctly white, 
Christian and Hungariain national identity. The idea that Hungary is strictly for Hungarians. 
Second, his assault on European political elites served to justify his larger goals of expanding the 
status and power of the nation state vis-a-vis the European Union. Orban stands as a par 




If there was any event that brought populism into the mainstream it was the election of 
Donald Trump in 2016. The result of the election came as a shock to the entire world with many 
questioning how a candidate like Trump could become President of the United States. I contend 
that Trump, now the world’s most powerful populist, was successful because of the populist 
discourse that he espoused and crisis narratives that he constructed during his campaign. His “us 
vs. them” rhetoric and construction of an America in crisis served to instill anxiety in the 
American population, an anxiety that he claimed he alone could solve. 
Trump’s campaign was founded on the same anti-pluralist, anti-elite, and crisis 
sentiments as the other populists included in this paper. Statements such as “I used to be 
establishment...when I decided to run, I became very anti-establishment” (Blake 2016)  set 
Trump apart from the self-serving and corrupt political elite who he claimed were responsible for 
America’s decline. He made it abundantly clear that “the problems we face now...will last only 
as long as we continue relying on the same politicians who created them in the first place...No 
longer can we rely on those elites in media, and politics, who will say anything to keep a rigged 
system in place.” (Trump 2016b). Hillary Clinton, Trump’s opponent in the 2016 election, 
became the synecdochical stand-in for Washington’s political elite, with Trump saying that she 
embodied “the failed status quo” (Homolar and Scholz 2019) and that while his problem was that 
“ I can be too honest… Hillary Clinton was the exact opposite: she never tells the truth” 
(Homolar and Scholz 2019). Trump’s smear-campaign of Hillary Clinton was profoundly 
successful in fostering dislike for her, with his supporters often chanting “Lock her up!” at rallys, 
wearing t-shirts that read ‘Trump that Bitch’, and the emergence of the nickname ‘crooked 
Hillary’ in conservative discourse. Trump relied on similar name-calling to interrogate the 
morality and competence of his other established political opponents: ‘Low Energy Jeb’, ‘Little 
Marco’, ‘Lyin Ted’, and ‘Pocahontas’. What this shows is that Trump’s ‘us vs. them’ discourse 
gained traction among his supporters and served to position Trump as a political outsider who 
was the only hope of saving an America in ‘serious trouble’ (Homolar and Scholz 2019). 
Trump’s attacks against the political establishment have only become more pronounced 
since coming into office. One need only spend several minutes on Trump’s twitter to see 
evidence of such conspiratorial narratives, which point to the liberal establishment as having 
orchestrated his impeachment, the indictment of General Michael Flynn, “Obamagate”, the 
“Russia hoax”, and widespread election tampering. He has also followed in the strategic 
footsteps of Hugo Chavez, expanding the scope of the conspiracy against him to outside 
America’s borders. He tweeted, “China is on a massive disinformation campaign because they 
are desperate to have Sleepy Joe Biden win the presidential race so they can continue to rip-off 
the United States, as they have done for decades, until I came along” (@realDonaldTrump, May 
20, 2020). Such claims serve to create a narrative of shadowy political elites who are seeking to 
undermine his political success and stifle the will of the ‘people’, eroding voters’ confidence in 
their democratic institutions.  
Trump was also effective in identifying immigrants as symptomatic of wider political and 
economic crises. His depiction of immigrants was distinctly antagonistic, referring to them as 
‘criminals’, ‘rapists’, ‘killers’, ‘snakes’, and ‘terrorists’ who like ‘chopping off heads’ (Homolar 
and Scholz 2019). This depiction served to stoke fear and anger in his constituency, by pointing 
to immigrants as responsible for America’s deteriorating economy and a threat to Americans’ 
security. As with Viktor Orban in Hungary, this antagonistic portrayal of immigrants was also 
used as evidence of a failing political establishment, the ones who allowed such immigrants into 
their country, and who therefore do not have Americans’ security in mind. This then further 
justifies a radical campaign against the system that vows to overhaul the existing establishment 
in the name of the good ‘people’. Trump was able to “forge a rhetorical bond with Americans 
over worries that the country was disintegrating and radically changing, the economy was 
deteriorating, and ferocious enemies and minorities were growing emboldened” (Homolar and 
Scholz 2019).  
Since the 2016 election, Donald Trump has attacked and condemned American media 
outlets in order to shield himself from criticism, attack dissenters, and to perpetuate a sense that 
the press is in a state of crisis. Popularizing the term “fake news”, Trump has been successful in 
linking the press, particularly liberal media outlets, to the corrupt political establishment who he 
insists are eager to undermine him and manipulate the ‘people’.  Once in office, he tweeted “The 
LameStream Media has gone totally CRAZY!...They are only looking for the kill. They are now 
beyond Fake, they are Corrupt.” (@realDonaldTrump September 2, 2019). Later that day, he 
turned to Twitter again to say “Our real opponent is not the Democrats, or the dwindling number 
of Republicans that lost their way and got left behind, our primary opponent is the Fake News 
Media. In the history of our Country they have never been so bad” (@realDonaldTrump 
September 2, 2019). These attacks against the media serve Trump’s interests in that they bring 
about a sense that even the truth is in crisis. This narrative can be used against anyone who 




  In the preceding account I have sought to bring some conceptual clarity to the 
complicated and hotly contested topic of populism, a phenomenon that is emerging in 
democracies across the world and may prove to have lasting effects on democratic institutions. 
My intention has not been to define what populism is or how it should be categorized, but to 
locate its conceptual core. I have sought to achieve this by developing an understanding of the 
discursive features that appear in all populists’ discourses. 
The first section of this paper was structured as a critical literature review and was my 
attempt to synthesize the work of academics operating in the field of populism. I have immense 
respect for the work of these academics and their theories have informed my entire 
understanding of populism. However, I have intended to show in this paper that the debates 
between academics are somewhat misguided. There exists a broad consensus about the nature of 
populism and what makes it a unique political phenomenon, yet academics, eager to set their 
own work apart from their colleagues’ have insisted on arguing about the minutiae of populism’s 
definition. Assuming populism’s presence in the world will continue to grow, populist scholars 
must come to an agreement about the necessary and sufficient conditions for populism. They can 
no longer be embroiled in debates about the definition of populism, they must expand their scope 
of analysis to new areas of study. In this paper, I have proposed a method for applying a 
discursive analysis of cases that appear to be populist. Populist discourses rely on three central 
features (1) ‘the people’, (2) ‘the elite’, (3) ‘the crisis’. Therefore, if a political figure’s discourse 
satisfies these criteria, that individual can be identified as populist. In short, I propose these three 
discursive features as sufficient conditions for identifying populism.  
Additionally, I have sought to develop an understanding of how these discursive features 
operate and how they contribute to the success of populism as a sociopolitical movement and 
counter-discourse. Populists’ ability to amass millions of supporters is made possible by the 
antagonistic frontier they create between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. The only way that populists 
can build support for their radical cause is by creating a political narrative that can encompass 
the manifold of demands and interests that exist in democratic societies. To create equivalence 
out of such a diversity of differences and to constitute a collective will, populists must clearly 
define an antagonistic and oppressive adversary. They must present an “Other” that negatively 
constitutes the “We”. In the case of populism the “Other” is ‘the elite”, the morally corrupt 
oppressors who are responsible for the marginalization of ‘the people’. In creating a single 
culprit, responsible for all of society’s ills, populists create a narrative that can explain a wide 
array of systemic failures and can encompass the demands of a whole host of disparate social 
groups.  
Since populists challenge dominant narratives and propose radical changes to political 
institutions, they must find a way to justify these policies, since typically such actions would be 
seen as unacceptable or outside the realm of possibility. The construction of ‘the people’ 
becomes an essential part of their justification. In democracies, the will of ‘the people’ is 
sacrosanct, there is no institution more powerful or more legitimate. Even a constitution cannot 
constrain the will of ‘the people’. Therefore, in claiming to represent ‘the people’ a populist 
positions themselves above the existing constitution and all other institutions which acquire their 
legitimacy through the constitution. If the will of ‘the people’ - as articulated by the populist - is 
to rewrite the constitution and centralize power in the hands of the executive, then existing 
institutions cannot constrain this demand. Populism is then extremely volatile because it exploits 
a paradox that exists at the heart of all democracies.  
In a democracy, the only body that may legitimately act in an authoritarian way are ‘the 
people’. This is because only ‘the people’ have the sovereign right to impose their will on the 
system, regardless of how undemocratic that will may be. Populists claim to represent ‘the 
people’ and the will of ‘the people’ , although ‘the people’ could not exist prior to the 
articulation of them and imputation of a will to them by the populist. In this way, populists can 
argue that everything they do is in line with the will of ‘the people’ – and thus legitimate. They 
may then freely transform a democracy into an authoritarian state while insisting they are 
carrying out the will of ‘the people’. Not only is such an action legitimate, as it is in accordance 
with democratic values and procedures, populists can argue that such an action enhances the 
democratic process because it gives a voice back to the people whose voice had been taken away 
by ‘the elites’. In short, claiming to speak for ‘the people’ is far from innocuous, it is in fact the 
most formidable claim that a political representative can make because it can enable political 
actors to legitimately act undemocratically.  
The second section of this paper developed an understanding of the socially contingent 
nature of crisis and its central role in populist counter-narratives. In order to mount a credible 
challenge against the dominant political narratives, populists must depict the present as a 
decisive moment in history, a moment that necessitates the emergence of a radical counter-
narrative to replace a failing one. Populists identify a variety of political failings as symptomatic 
of a larger crisis, bringing into question the competence and legitimacy of the ruling ‘elite’. I 
have emphasized that these crises cannot be thought of as material or objective fact, rather crises 
are socially constructed and contingent upon the narratives that bring them into existence. The 
populist instrumentalizes crisis, bringing crises to life in an effort to legitimize their 
unprecedented assault on the existing democratic system.  
What makes crisis narratives so effective is that they remove the sense of stability from 
our lives and bring into question the security of our futures. These feelings of instability and 
uncertainty force us to seek resolution, so that we may re-establish a secure sense of self as 
quickly as possible. In times like these, we gravitate towards those people who revealed the crisis 
to us in the first place, as they appear to be the only source of stability in an unstable world. In 
this way, crisis narratives function both as a threat and a reassurance. They offer what appears to 
be an objective view on the present conjuncture, they identify the actors responsible for this state 
of affairs, dividing the populations into culprits and victims, and then they provide an abstract 
route out of the present conjuncture that is contingent upon their election. Crisis settings, 
therefore, can have a profound impact on electoral decisions and can explain the electoral 
success of populists. People who may typically be risk-averse in their electoral decision-making, 
become more inclined to support unestablished politicians when they feel that the established 
politicians are the ones responsible for some sort of crisis. In this way, by creating a crisis 
setting, populists open up the possibility for a counter-narrative to take hold. Without the crisis 
narrative, populists would be unable to justify their radical anti-establishment claims or justify 
the solutions that they profess to have. 
Though the topic of crisis emerges in the academic literature on populism, little attention 
is paid to how populists instrumentalize crisis once they get into office. While there is some 
consensus in the scholarship as to how crises launch populists to power, I have tried to illustrate 
how crises enable populists to remain in power. Since crisis is constructed by the populist, it is 
the populist alone who has the power to resolve the crisis. What many populists in power come 
to realize is that crises are better left unresolved, because to resolve them, would only be to 
remove the political leverage that they afford. Populists present crises initially as something that 
they can solve, they present them as transitional periods, a state of exception. However, once in 
power, the crisis narratives in fact become more pronounced, more entrenched, and more 
conspiratorial. They are constructed as deep-rooted problems that will take years to solve, thus 
justifying the populist’s indefinite reelection and serving as a convenient explanation for all 
those failures they are unable to address. 
  What we must realize about populism is that it is founded upon elements that are entirely 
socially constructed. ‘The people’, ‘the elite’, and ‘the crisis’ are not things that exist objectively, 
they are rhetorical tools that populists construct and employ to justify their extreme political 
platform. Without these elements - and the feelings of anger, fear, and antagonism that they 
awaken in ‘the people’ -  populism would likely be relegated to the periphery of the political 
spectrum, be labeled “extremist”, and would probably only be supported by a minority. Instead, 
these discursive elements create a compelling version of reality that mobilizes massive 
populations of people against a vague enemy under the pretense of some crisis. However, since 
populism cannot exist without fear and antagonism, populists in power must continue to depict 
reality in this way. They manufacture the problems that they vow to solve and it these problems 
that grant them legitimacy. Consequently, they cannot ever solve these problems and must 
continue to depict reality in antagonistic ways. What we must realize about populism is that it 
can appear as an extremely attractive discourse that promises a better future. However, this 
promising future can never be achieved because populists will always perpetuate anger and fear 
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